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The question “can machines think” has manifested and been popular-
ised in many forms, from cybernetic creations such as Terminator, to 
Dr Who’s Daleks and Hal in Arthur C Clarke’s unforgettable ‘2001: A 
Space Odyssey’. All of these have presented man’s inner fear of any-
thing that is not of himself and each incarnation of the mechanical men-
ace has been intent upon the destruction of man.
There are few apparent exceptions to this trend. Douglas Adams’ para-
noid android, Marvin, with a “brain the size of a planet” at first seems 
comical in his ability to at once make fiendishly complex calculations 
yet be unable to deal with his own apparently trivial problems and dis-
orders. Further analysis however alludes to a deeper human problem, 
that our quest to know the answer to “life, the universe and everything” 
may only result in misery, that knowing everything removes the basic 
desire to acquire further knowledge and therefore removes a base hu-
man motivation.
Dr Who’s mechanical canine companion K-9 also appears to be a super-
intelligent and helpful aide. However, the social relationship of man to 
dog, with man as master, often becomes reversed as K-9’s scripted witty 
retorts and logical observations show man’s insecurity in the face of in-
telligent machines and reveal his fear of becoming dominated by them.
Even Star Trek’s Commander Data manages to show man’s inferior-
ity complex. Despite being hugely intelligent and an accepted member 
of the crew, during his quest to become more human-like he becomes 
helpless when the Borg attempt to assimilate him into the collective by 
fitting his arm with a sheet of human skin. In this position Data is no 
longer the hyper-intelligent, logical machine but instead becomes man 
and, as man, also possesses his fragility and his weaknesses in the face 
of his cybernetic domineers.
There is a serious side to this discussion that Alan Turing first opened 
for debate when he asked the same question “can machines think” in his 
article in Mind, A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy in 
1950 (Turing, 1950). Turing goes to great length to define what is meant 
by ‘machines’ and arrives at the term ‘digital computers’. This was an 
important distinction at the time but is a phrase that will be comfortable 
for any modern user of desktop or laptop computers or the myriad ar-
ray of other devices which contain a computer including washing ma-
chines, fridge freezers and alarm clocks.
The Turing Test For Intelligence
Turing proposes to determine whether a machine is intelligent by play-
ing what he terms the “imitation game” (Turing, 1950, p433). This 
game involves three participants that are separated from one another, 
perhaps in different rooms, so that none can see or hear any other. One 
of these people is the ‘interrogator’ who may communicate with the 
other two by asking questions by means of a keyboard and may receive 
their typed responses on some form of visual display. The interrogator’s 
task is to determine which of the other two participants is human or a 
computer. 
Despite the simplicity of the game it has provoked much discussion, 
from concerns over the applicability of the discussion interface, to deep 
philosophical questions of the very meaning of intelligence. Indeed 
Turing was quick to challenge his own proposition and provides a num-
ber of refutations and counter-arguments for the possibility of having 
machines that think.
Firstly there is’ the theological argument’ which centres around whether 
a non-human could possess a soul – the soul being suggested as a neces-
sity for thought and intelligence. Turing suggests that, by definition, any 
Creator is omnipotent and therefore capable of bestowing a soul upon 
any entity if he/she wished thus at least giving the concept of a thinking-
machine the possibility of existence. Some would argue that this is a 
weak reasoning against the theological argument and somewhat akin 
to posing the question “can a Creator create a stone that he/she could 
not lift?” Any response to this question concludes that a Creator cannot 
exist. If he/she could not make a stone that could not be lifted then the 
Creator could not be said to be omnipotent; there would be a feasible 
object that the Creator could not create. Alternatively if he/she could 
create a stone that could not be lifted then also, he/she could not be said 
to be omnipotent; there would be an object that he/she would be unable 
to move by lifting.  The central issue remains, that just because an om-
nipotent Creator could provide a thinking-machine with a soul does not 
necessarily mean that he/she would, especially if man had been created 
in the first instance in the Creator’s own image.
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Many people consider that robots with human-like cognition is an old 
fantasy of science fiction books, but in countries like Japan, billions of 
dollars are pumped every year into artificial intelligence, in an attempt 
to offset an increasingly aging population. However, challenges to the 
creation of such machines are not just technical but also social and ethi-
cal, hence this area of research has been surrounded by long lasting de-
bates. Here, White and Djebarni discuss the arguments for and against 
thinking machines, by considering what is known as the Turning Test, 
and explain the potential use of this test in artificial intelligence. 
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The second argument entitled ‘heads in the sand’ is that which the popu-
lar science-fiction literature commonly depicts, that man is somehow 
inherently superior to everything else and in demonstrating or feeling 
this way manages to maintain his “commanding position”. Turing lik-
ens this argument to the theological argument and man’s belief in his 
superiority over all other things, perhaps because man is often decreed 
to have been made in the Creator’s image. He also suggests that this ar-
gument would be more likely to be upheld by intellectual people “since 
they value the power of thinking more highly than others” (Turing, 
1950, p444). It could also be argued that intellectuals are in fact less 
likely to uphold this argument since their endless quest for knowledge, 
unlike Marvin The Paranoid Android’s, is never ending and they are 
humbled in the face of this insurmountable task: as Tao Le Ching said, 
“the more you know, the less you understand”.
The ‘mathematical objection’ cites complex mathematical theorems to 
place limits on the computational, and therefore on the thinking-powers, 
of machines. In short, there are logical conditions where it is supposed 
that machines will be unable to provide an answer. Humans though, are 
thought to not be subject to the same constraints and this is believed to 
be one area where ‘digital machines’ are unable to demonstrate a par-
ticular kind of intelligence. However, it has recently been shown that 
artificial intelligences are quite capable of logical error when provided 
with some form of memory and appear to mimic the behaviour of hu-
man children (Reilly and Robson, 2007). This development suggests 
that true artificial intelligences can exist even if they have to be less than 
perfect, just like us, in order for us to pronounce them ‘intelligent’.
The ‘argument from consciousness’ states that a machine could not feel 
or possess human emotions. Furthermore, that the only way to discern 
whether any machine did in fact possess an emotion would be to be that 
machine. The reader may take a moment here to consider whether he or 
she actually needs to be their wife, partner, mother or friend in order to 
determine that they are extremely annoyed that you have forgotten their 
birthday for the third year in a row!
‘Arguments from various disabilities’ suggest that machines could not 
display human characteristics such as love, taste or be able to think of 
itself as a conscious entity. Turing argues that this assertion primarily 
arises from man’s experience of computers that have already existed. 
He suggests that limited storage capacity is one reason for such con-
straints. If this is true then we can expect machines to begin to display 
such characteristics or behaviours at some point in the not too distant 
future. In 1965 Moore’s Law predicted that basic computing power will 
double every two years and this prediction has so far been surprisingly 
accurate. An extrapolation of this trend reveals that by the year 2020 a 
single silicone chip may be imprinted with one hundred billion transis-
tors, a quantity that would be equivalent to the number of neurons in a 
human brain: would such a device then possess the same computational 
power and capability as a human brain? One also only needs to look 
at the range of technical model-building kits available for children to 
find models that are festooned with heat, light and touch sensors. Can 
we deny that even these simple models are really sensing and autono-
mously responding to these inputs?
Can we also deny that the range of sensory inputs that a human possess-
es are incredibly more varied, numerous and subtle compared to such 
electro-mechanical devices and consequently that a thinking-machine’s 
responses will restricted by such limited variability: fundamentally, can 
a machine be truly aware of itself and its actions in ethical and moral 
senses as the argument from consciousness proposes?
‘Lady Lovelace’s objection’ maintains that computers could be pro-
grammed or instructed to perform a vast array of tasks or functions 
but that they could never produce original thought. Turing questions 
whether any supposedly original human thought or creation is abso-
lutely unique or whether it can be traced back to some prior instruction 
or suggestion from experience or from a teacher, just as the actions of 
a digital machine could be traced to its original programming or in-
struction. One could argue that such a deterministic view of creativity 
ultimately results in the necessity for there to be a Creator of some form 
to provide a first thought or idea in man. Such a line of reasoning could 
refute any atheistic objections to the theological argument.
‘Argument from continuity of the nervous system’ portrays a fundamen-
tal mechanical difference between man and machines, that machines 
are configured such that they are either ‘on’ or ‘off’ but the human sys-
tem is continuous and may be at an (almost) infinite number of states. 
Turing describes the process whereby a small difference in input to a 
human nerve may result in a disproportionately large output. Does such 
an argument require us to be very precise in our interrogation during the 
Turing Test, for, as humans, do we describe our feelings in such contin-
uously variable states? Do we state that we are 33.33% happy and do we 
differentiate that state from being 45% happy? Or is it sufficient for us 
to be ‘unhappy’ or ‘quite happy’ and make more relativistic statements? 
For the purpose of Turing’s imitation game, could a human interrogator 
discern the difference between a human and a computer that both de-
scribed themselves as ‘delighted’, or, pragmatically speaking, is it even 
likely that a thinking machine would be constructed or instructed so that 
it responded to the question “how happy are you” with the reply “I am 
62.5% happy” which is such an obviously non-human remark!
The ‘argument of informality of behaviour’ predicts that it is not pos-
sible to describe a set of computational rules that can account for every 
set of circumstances that may arise in the real world. Turing gives the 
example of a set of traffic signals where a green light indicates ‘go’ 
and a red light means ‘stop’ and wonders how an artificial intelligence 
would react if both red and green lights were shown simultaneously. It 
is tempting at first to perhaps suggest that a general rule to ‘seek least 
risk’ is somehow also coded in the machine’s instructions. This would 
also result in the decision to stop and this seems to be a rational behav-
iour which could be attributed to intelligence. However, ‘seeking least 
risk’ is not what humans do. Whilst many of us are risk averse there 
are some groups of people, such as entrepreneurs, that actively seek 
out risk (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Caird, 1993). Consequently, 
it is difficult to see how a set of rules, however large in number, could 
conceivably suggest an appropriate action for every possible variation 
of situations in which we may find ourselves. Turing argues that just be-
cause it is beyond our capabilities at present to determine which laws or 
rules govern human existence does not necessarily mean that such rules 
do not exist, a refutation that is analogous to declaring “just because we 
haven’t found fairies at the bottom of the garden does not mean they are 
not there!”  However, adopting such a position means that anything is 
possible until it is observed whereupon it becomes true; conversely, just 
because it hasn’t been observed does not mean that it is not true. For an 
atheistic objector to the theological argument this presents problems. 
It means that the existence of a Creator must be possible until such 
time that we meet him or her and are able to state categorically that the 
existence of the Creator is true; even if we never meet him or her the 
possibility of their existence cannot be disproved.
The entire argument also rests upon the supposition that such rules of 
conduct or behaviour are somehow embedded within us a priori. Un-
doubtedly many of our actions and responses to real-world situations 
are acquired socially, by observing the actions of others in similar or 
comparable situations. The acquisition of such rules a posteriori sug-
gests that it would never be possible to encapsulate the entire set of 
rules of conduct in a single individual. These rules would be continually 
adjusting and evolving, even appearing spontaneously in the same way 
that knowledge does when individuals interact with their environment 
(Kluge, Stein and Licht, 2001).
Finally the ‘argument from extra-sensory perception’ posits that ESP 
could exists in humans and this may provide an invisible link
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between the interrogator and the human test subject thus invalidating 
any attempts to discern intelligent thought in the machine. However, 
the counter argument is disturbingly fascinating: if the machine was 
intelligent and ESP does exist in humans then there would be no reason 
why the machine would not possess ESP too! 
Organizational Intelligence
Much academic work is devoted to describing and understanding orga-
nizational learning and organizational knowledge (Tsoukas, 2001) and 
it has been shown that information technologies, or computing systems, 
are central to the ability of an organization to create and manage knowl-
edge and thus become ‘intelligent’ (Zhu, Prietule and Hsu, 1997). There 
is however some debate over whether the organization is intelligent in 
the sense that a single human being is intelligent, or whether organi-
zations are merely constructs within which intelligent individuals act 
(Mueller and Dyerson, 1999). 
Perhaps this situation of ambiguity and uncertainty is one where the 
Turing Test could be employed? It is, after all, a test designed to in-
dicate intelligence in computer-based systems or entities. Perhaps the 
arguments that have been presented by Turing and others that challenge 
the notion of computer intelligence would not be applicable to the use 
of the test in investigating organizational intelligence?
Is it likely that anyone would raise the theological argument and con-
sider an organization that acts intelligently to have to possess a soul? 
Is it also likely that an intelligent organization would be expected to 
demonstrate any aspects of human-like intelligence? The notion of an 
organization that had a deep desire for ice-cream for example is not one 
that comes easily to the mind. Anyone that shares Turing’s perspective 
though may posit that there is no reason why a truly intelligent organi-
zation, or any other conceivable intelligent entity, should not be capable 
of possessing a soul if a Creator desired it. 
At this juncture it is necessary to end the discourse. However, the jour-
ney has hardly yet begun. The casual reader may wish to contemplate 
how Turing’s arguments for and against thinking machines apply to 
other entities that may also be intelligent, such as, collections of indi-
viduals including organizations and larger communities, or they may 
even contemplate how we could determine if an alien entity was intel-
ligent if it did not possess forms of communication that we possess such 
as speech, writing, touch or ESP. The academic reader, organizational 
expert or computer specialist may consider how the information system 
of an organization could be interrogated or interpreted in order to deter-
mine intelligence. To this end I offer the final food for thought.
We must return to the original format of the test to recall that it is a 
comparative test, that an interrogator is required to tell the difference 
between an intelligent entity and a non-intelligent entity. Whereas must 
of the organizational literature has focussed upon how or if organiza-
tions are intelligent, a Turing-like Test offers the opportunity to make 
a comparative analysis of organizational intelligence. By doing this the 
philosophical debate over what constitutes intelligence is nullified and 
we become more interested in whether a subject organization appears 
more intelligent than another subject: it is also allowable for both test 
subjects to be organizations so that we may assess their comparative 
intelligence. 
Such a test is not dissimilar from many comparisons that organiza-
tions already employ to measure or benchmark themselves against 
competition. Numerous international and industry-specific measures of 
comparison exist covering organizational characteristics from quality 
performance to financial performance to their attitude towards their em-
ployees. Where this test differs though is that it is administered indepen-
dently, by an interrogator, and not self-administered as many existing 
measures are. Also, the Test would be performed upon the information 
system and not the employees that the organization comprises so that 
the response of the organization to environmental factors is measured 
in terms of changes in its information system intelligence rather than in 
changes in the attitude and opinion of employees. 
In order that organizational intelligence comparisons are meaningful 
it would be necessary to devise an array of standardised questions or 
conditions to which organizational response is recorded or measured. 
At first the number of conditions to which an organization must respond 
may seem almost infinite, indeed any factor that could be categorised 
as Political, Environmental, Sociological, Technological, Legal, Envi-
ronmental (PESTLE) or any factor that was an organizational Strength, 
Weakness, Opportunity or Threat (SWOT), could and should induce 
some intelligent reaction in an intelligent organization. This may seem 
an impossible number of factors with which to interrogate an organiza-
tion.
Rather than attempting to replicate the myriad conditions and factors 
that affect an organization it is much easier to replace the question func-
tion of the interrogator with the business environment as it already ex-
ists. This has the further advantage of removing any argument that the 
organizational stimuli are in any way artificial. All that remains is to 
observe, measure and record the response of organizational information 
systems in response to those changing business conditions. 
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